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A TALE OF
Two Taxcuts
Paul Keating's One Nation package helped rescue the 
government's fortunes. The cost, however, was meeting 
the Coalition's tax cut promises. Peter Groenewegett 
argues it's time to call a halt to the tax-cut bidding war. 
Tax cuts have their uses, but the evidence points to the 
need for raising taxes, not lowering them.
T
he Tax Gunfight' was the Sydney 
Telegraph-Minor’s response to Paul 
Keating's One Nation package in late 
February. PM and would-be-PM 
were suitably adorned with stetsons and gun- 
belts, flanking commentary depicting the One 
Nation/Fightback! confrontation as a saga in the 
spirit of the Gunfight at the OK Corral. Follow­
ing the battle of the taxcuts was as gripping, we 
were told, as a Fenech world title fight, an 
Australian victory in the World Cup, or the latest 
episode in the battle of the sexes in Chances.
The more 'serious' newspapers around the nation, less 
colourful than Sydney's sole surviving tabloid, examined 
the battle as another exercise in 'who wins, who loses'. 
Given the confrontationist style of Parliament—which
many journalists seem to think the one redeeming feature 
of democracy—the two packages tended invariably to be 
scrutinised for their differences rather than their 
similarities; gone are the days when the party platforms 
could be summarised in the imagery of Tweedledum and 
Tweedledee.
Yet, while there are many differences of great import be­
tween Fightback! and One Nation, there is also much that is 
similar. In particular, it is sadly true that both packages 
pander to the populist disease currently afflicting 
politicians of all hues for appealing to the public's appetite 
for bigger and better tax cuts. Nor is this disease confined 
to Australian politicians: the Economist of 29 February 
implored British politicians 'Don't Cut Taxes', in the runup 
to this month's elections. The tax-cut fixation is all the more 
relevant when two decades of this mindset have driven 
Australia from the top of the bottom third in the OECD tax 
league to as close to the bottom as a self-respecting 
developed nation can get.
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The political attractions of tax cuts are too well-known to 
require much comment. Inflation and 'bracket creep' (the 
erosion of the real thresholds of tax rates by inflation) are 
still of great im portance, even with our drastically 
simplified rate scale and lower recent inflation rates. And 
tax cuts are always on call to redistribute an inflation-in­
duced tax yield bonanza to whichever group of deserving 
'middle income earners' have been drawn to the party 
pollsters' attention. Inaugurated by one of Gorton's one- 
year treasurers, Leslie Bury, the political tax cut was as­
siduously practised by subsequent Treasurers Billy 
:Snedden, Frank Crean, Bill Hayden, Phil Lynch, John 
Howard and, most recently, Paul Keating himself— 
probably the most notorious instance being Malcolm 
Fraser's 'fistful of dollars' election campaign in 1977.
The common thread through these instances is that the 
grandiosity of their announcement ('the biggest tax reform 
since federation') is equalled only by the rapidity of their 
retreat from memory. Malcolm Fraser's one-year excursus 
into income tax rate indexation, hailed on its introduction 
as the greatest fiscal reform ever, was five years later 
described by his then-treasurer John Howard as a luxury 
no realistic politician could afford. The vague promises 
about automatic tax indexation in Fightback! ring par­
ticularly hollow when it is remembered that its architect 
was an unelected member of the gang which cobbled 
together Fraser's fiscal Xanadus during the early 1980s.
What is the case for tax cuts? And, more specifically, what 
is the case for further personal income tax cuts? To sort out
the rhetoric from the analysis, it is not really necessary to 
wade through the catch-cries about the merits of a 'leaner' 
public sector—catch-cries which in any case can only be 
muted given the massive relative reduction in the size of 
the public sector over the last half-decade or so. Focus 
instead on the more important issue of the tax policy 
context in which the tax cuts are made.
For example, in the change in the tax mix from taxing 
income to taxing consumption advocated in Fightback!, 
income tax cuts can in certain circumstances play a 
legitimate role in compensating for a new broad-based 
consumption tax (GST). Such a policy has merit to the 
extent that it rationalises the tax system by replacing 
Australia's antiquated and indefensible wholesale sales 
tax (an objective, however, which it is perfectly possible to 
pursue without massive income tax cuts of the Fightback! 
variety).
Nevertheless, in many respects a change in the tax base has 
less merit today than it would have had in the early 1980s. 
Income tax administration has become much more efficient 
in the last few years, thanks to tax file numbers, selective 
audits, improved substantiation requirements and more 
common deduction of tax instalments at source—and this 
has been assisted by some adventurous, though still 
limited, base-broadening (the capital gains and fringe 
benefit taxes). Tax compliance has in consequence vastly 
improved from the days of the 1970s and early 1980s—a 
time when it could have been said with justice that income 
tax was voluntary for non-PAYE earners.
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What other justifiable reasons are there for cutting income 
tax? Restructuring tax rates by adjusting the thresholds at 
which those rates come into operation can be a useful 
corrective to the ravages of inflation. Of course, an even 
more effective corrective would be simply to index income 
tax thresholds for inflation—though policymakers have 
traditionally rejected this for what may well be quite sound 
fiscal reasons.
However, there is a broader framework to consider here. 
Tax cuts can have a role to play in wider macroeconomic 
policy-making, enhancing the capacity of the government 
to bolster demand in time of recession, attack the distribu­
tion of wealth in our society, and enable resources to be 
allocated more efficiently between sectors. Addressing the 
issue of tax cuts in these terms helps us understand the 
pros and cons of the two tax cuts currently on offer. It also 
enables us to pierce that dark veil called 'fiscal illusion', 
which masks some of the real dangers inherent in tax-cut- 
ting for political purposes.
First, tax cuts can have a significant role to play in stabilisa­
tion policy—in other words, in circumstances when the 
government needs to use macroeconomic policy to remedy 
a general deficiency in demand and rising unemployment. 
Across-the-board income tax cuts have been a longstand­
ing means of lifting the overall level of demand in a reces­
sion such as the present one. One advantage is speed: the 
pay-as-you-eam system, since it docks wages at source, 
can also bolster pay packets and thus spending power 
quickly. The effectiveness of tax cuts in stimulating 
demand is all the greater if they are skewed towards lower 
income levels, since low-income earners spend more of 
what they earn, and spend a greater percentage of it on 
domestically-produced goods, than the well-to-do.
Another useful tax cut policy tool for recessions is a selec­
tive cut in sales tax, which can help stimulate demand in 
specific industries. Paul Keating's sales tax cut on im­
ported cars in One Nation clearly falls into this category. 
Nevertheless, its effect will probably be short-lived, since 
its main effect will be to bring forward car sales rather than 
increase their total. The same stimulus to demand can also 
be achieved in other ways (and potentially more effective­
ly)— such as by carefully-designed spending packages 
aimed at infrastructure to boost employment in the right 
place at the right time. Yet counter-cyclical public invest­
ment planning, on which great hopes were built in the 
1930s,has rarely been seriously attempted. It appears that 
politicians and bureaucrats find it easier to face political- 
ly-appealing 'quick fixes' rather than longer-term plan­
ning.
Income tax cuts can also have a useful role in attacking the 
maldistribution of income. Nevertheless, generally speak­
ing increasing taxes is a more useful means of reducing 
income and wealth inequalities—particularly when that 
revenue is used for targetting expenditure to the less ad­
vantaged in the community. This is because spending 
programs have greater distributional potency, particularly 
when combined with a robust and fairly-implemented tax 
system.
Again, tax cuts in isolation can also be judged for their 
distributional impact, though when they are introduced as 
part of a major package it is of course the overall effect of 
the tax policy which is important. In any case, such exer­
cises generate com plex theoretical and p ractical 
problems—particularly when the time horizon of the 
reforms is lengthy, as is the case with One Nation and 
Fightback! It is worth remembering that economics is an 
imperfect science, that forecasting is fraught with uncer­
tainty, that its theoretical propositions are often untestable, 
and that many of its conclusions embody assumptions of 
considerable arbitrariness. All the same, it has to be said 
that in their economic credibility both Fightback! and One 
Nation are miles in front of the flat-tax phantasies of a few 
years ago, whose castles in the air, built on growth and 
productiv ity  supposedly generated  through 
'incentivation', even mesmerised ex-Treasury luminaries 
like John Stone.
‘A populist urge for 
oppeoling to the appetite 
for bigger and bigger 
tax cuts.1
There are a few distributional principles that potential 
tax-cutters would do well to keep in mind. For instance, 
raising the tax-free threshold raises the relative importance 
of the tax cut for the lower paid (its progressivity), but may 
also benefit the undeserving (some income-splitters, for 
example), and affects the tax burden of all, including the 
highest paid. Cutting marginal tax rates at the lower end 
of the scale assists those immediately affected, but because 
it likewise affects all taxpayers in higher brackets, it is 
exceedingly costly. Reducing maximum tax rates to bring 
them into equality with those overseas (such as the US or 
the 'Asian Tigers') may lay claim to recognising the poten­
cy of international tax competition, but it also wreaks 
havoc with the progressivity of the system. In short, some 
tax cuts are distributionally preferable to others, but most 
would be vastly improved if combined with increases in 
the tax base. Superannuation and housing are two instan­
ces of such base-widening—and in the first of these 
Fightback! is clearly ahead of the government.
The third issue of importance in considering tax cuts is 
their potential impact on the efficient allocation of resour­
ces between different sectors of the economy. Fightback's 
claims are particularly ambitious on this score. John 
Hewson's stated intention to secure zero inflation is well- 
known. In Fightback!, the known inflationary consequen­
ces of a 15% GST (in isolation from other policy measures) 
are supposedly offset by concomitant tax cuts in fuel ex­
cise, sales tax and payroll tax—the intention being to 
reduce the total inflationary impact to just 4.4%. Yet this is 
probably optimistic. If the GST creates the 'fiscal illusion' 
of falling wages, a wage push aimed at offsetting the 
increased prices of goods under a GST could shatter those 
inflationary expectations. Likewise, financial market reac-
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Hons to a GST-induced one-off change in the value of the 
Australian dollar may have a further inflationary effect.
More important, however, are the claims Fightback! makes 
for its ability to rebuild and reward Australia. The key to 
this achievement, we are told, are the incentives generated 
from reduced tax rates, and the improved competitive 
advantage derived from the reduced costs to business. Yet 
the extravagant hopes raised in other countries and at other 
times for this sort of supply-side economics have rarely 
borne fruit. Reducing the marginal tax rates may lead to 
some added incentive to work, save, invest and take 
risks—but the precise amount of this effect is highly 
speculative, and much overrated by those on the conserva­
tive side of politics who in any case have a predisposition 
towards lower income tax rates. Here tax cuts can feed the 
dangerous conservative delusions of 'something for 
nothing' exemplified by the now-notorious Laffer Curve, 
so successfully peddled in the presidency of Ronald 
Reagan.
A less publicised allocational effect of tax cuts is their 
impact on the public sector and the desirable flow of 
publicly-provided goods and services. It is upon this 
neglected factor that I want to concentrate in my final 
comments. The ability of government and opposition to 
offer tax cuts is in one sense a product of the relative decline 
of the public sector over the last few years. Australia's 
public sector has been shrinking since 1985-6, with only a 
minor reversal recently owing merely to the dispropor­
tionate effects of the recession on the private sector. On 
average, the size of the public sector fell from 41.3% of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the early 1980s to 39% in 
the second half—a record not matched by many other 
OECD countries.
This trend has been accentuated by a statistical illusion in 
conventional measures of the growth of the public sector 
which tends to overestimate the size of the public sector, 
and hence to underestimate the effect of reductions in the 
size of the sector relative to GDP. The key to this illusion is 
the difficulty of measuring productivity and productivity 
gains in the public sector. By way of analogy, take the 
performance of a musical composition. The scope for 
productivity improvement in such cases becomes very 
restricted. A Schubert Trio cannot be performed by two 
people. Nor, if it was scored by the composer to take half 
an hour, can its performance be effectively reduced from 
the 1.5 person (performer) hours it takes to perform satis­
factorily to one person hour by reducing its performance 
to twenty minutes.
Schubert Trios are admittedly a boundary case. They il­
lustrate, however, that where the quality of output is tied 
to fairly specific inputs of labour, the ability to measure 
productivity gains in conventional terms is very restricted. 
Personal and community services embody many of the 
characteristics of the Schubert Syndrome; quality is sub­
stantially reduced if the required numbers or the requisite 
time is altered (eg larger class sizes or fewer counter 
staff)— though not always with the same dramatic conse­
quences as in the case of the Schubert Trio.
A number of more general conclusions can be drawn from 
the Schubert Syndrome (known in academic circles as the 
Baumol effect). The first is that some sectors of the economy 
have unrestricted capacity for productivity growth (such 
as primary industry, mining, manufacturing and some 
services), but there are other services where a certain 
labour content is an essential feature of the quality of the 
output. Over time, as the productivity of the former 
category of industries and services grows, they will appear 
to be using relatively fewer resources (in labour). At the 
same time, the latter category will appear when measured 
in the conventional ways to be rising over time as a share 
of national output and employment—a measurement 
which then appears in the data for the Gross Domestic 
Product, but which in some ways is quite spurious. To put 
the same point in another way, there are some goods and 
services from which increasing satisfaction can be obtained 
even when the relative resources (in labour) devoted to 
their production is falling; on the other hand, there are 
other outputs (Schubert-type ones), where the satisfaction 
derived from their output may be falling even when the 
relative resources devoted to them may appear to be rising.
The Schubert Syndrome has crucial implications for inter­
preting the conventional measures of public sector growth. 
It seems plausible that Schubert Trio-type goods are of 
greater importance in public provision than private 
provision. Given current views on what should be publicly 
provided, then, one would expect the share of the public 
sector in national resources to rise over time, not fall. When 
this is not the case, as is patently true for Australia for the 
last five years or so, the quality of the provision of those 
types of services will tend to decline continually.
The Schubert Syndrome also has a nice corollary for rela­
tive tax burdens and the ease with which they can be borne. 
A declining share of income going to private provision is 
perfectly sustainable, provided that, as a result of produc­
tivity growth, these declining resources produce an equal 
or greater satisfaction of wants. Hence, we could easily live 
in a 99% tax regime if the remaining one percent of dis­
posable income enabled the purchase of equivalent 
privately-produced goods and services. The moral is that 
rather than preaching the merits of further tax cuts, as 
politicians are all too prone to do, they should be selling 
tax rises as an essential price for maintaining the quality of 
those services provided by the governm ent which 
resemble that of the Schubert Trio.
It also suggests that balanced growth makes it appropriate 
for private sector market activities to enjoy a declining, not 
a rising, share of national resources. Sadly, however, 
neither One Nation nor Fightback! mention any of these 
concerns. Packages in praise of tax cuts do not always tell 
the full story.
PETER GROENEWEGEN is professor of economics at Syd­
ney University, and the author of the standard text Public 
Finance in Australia.
ALR : APRIL 1992
